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HEARSAY: PART IV 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
This is the fourth in a series of articles on the hearsay 
rule. It examines the hearsay exceptions in Ohio Rule of 
Evidence 804, exceptions which require the unavailabili-
ty of the declarant to be established as a condition for 
admissability. Rule 805, which governs double hearsay, 
and Rule 806, which regulates the impeachment of hear-
say declarants, are also discussed. 
FORMER TESTIMONY 
Rule 804(8)(1) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
former testimony. The rule provides for admissibility (1) of 
the testimony of a witness at another hearing or deposition; 
(2) if the party against whom the testimony is offered, or a 
predecessor in interest in a civil case, had an opportunity 
and similar motive to develop the testimony of the 
witness by direct, cross, or redirect examination; and (3) 
the witness is unavailable under Rule 804(A). The former 
testimony of a party is admissil:)le against that party as 
admission of a party-opponent. See Rule 801 (D)(2)(a). 
Rule 804(8)(1) supersedes RC 2945.49 (criminal cases) 
and 2317.06 (civil cases). 
In contrast to other hearsay exceptions, the former 
testimony exception is not based on any circumstantial 
guarantee of trustworthiness that is considered an 
adequate substitute for cross-examination. The Advisory 
Committee's Note to Federal Rule 804 comments: 
Former testimony does not rely upon some set of 
circumstances to substitute for oath and cross-
examination, since both oath and opportunity to cross-
examine were present in fact. The only missing .one of 
the ideal conditions for the giving of testimony is the 
presence of trier and opponent ("demeanor evidence"). 
This is lacking with all hearsay exceptions. Hence it 
may be argued that former testimony is the strongest 
hearsay and shold be included under Rule 803 supra. 
However, opportunity to observe demeanor is what in a 
large measure confers depth and meaning upon oath 
and cross-examination. Thus in cases under Rule 803 
demeanor lacks the significance which it possesses 
with respect to testimony. In any event, the tradition, 
founded in experience, uniformly favors production of 
the witness if he is available. The exception indicates 
continuation of the policy. This preference for the 
Jblic Defender Hyman Friedman 
presence of the witness is apparent also in rules and 
statutes on the use of depositions, which deal with 
substantially the same problem. 
Type of testimony 
The rule provides for the admissibility of testimony 
given "at another hearing of the same or a different 
proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance 
with law in the course of the same or another proceed-
ing." Depositions are governed by Grim. R. 15 and Juv. 
R. 25. See generally 2 Schroeder-Katz, Ohio Criminal 
Law, Grim. R. 15. See also RC 2945.50 and 2945.51 
(depositions in criminal cases). 
As originally adopted, Rule 804(8)(1) excluded 
preliminary hearing testimony from the former testimo-
ny exception. See 62 Ohio St.2d xlvii (1980). The exclu-
sion of preliminary hearing testimony was based upon 
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Roberts, 
55 Ohio St.2d 191,378 N.E.2d 492 (1978). The Court in 
Roberts held that admitting preliminary hearing 
testimony in a criminal trial violated the accused's 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. See also State 
v. Smith, 58 Ohio St.2d 344, 390 N.E.2d 778 (1979), 
vacated, 448 U.S. 902 (1980). Just days before the 
Rules of Evidence became effective, the Roberts deci-
sion was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
In response, the rule was amended by deleting the 
clause which exempted preliminary hearing testimony. 
See 53 Ohio Bar 1218 (1980). The deletion of this 
clause means that preliminary hearing testimony is 
admissible under the former testimony exception. It 
should be noted, however, that admitting preliminary 
hearing testimony in a criminal trial still raises confron-
tation issues. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that admitting the preliminary hearing testimony in 
Ohio v. Roberts was not error, the Court did not hold 
that the admission of preliminary hearing testimony 
will always be beyond constitutional attack. Hence the 
inclusion of preliminary hearing testimony within the 
former testimony exception changes the evidentiary, 
but not the constitutional, analysis. 
In addition to deposition and preliminary hearing 
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testimony, former testirnOflY inclui:Jestestimony given at 
a prior trial. See State v. Jester, 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 153, 
512 N.E.2d 962 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988); 
~heets v. Hodes, 142 Ohio St. 559, 53 N.E.2d 804 (1944); 
Summons v. State, 5 Ohio St. 559, 325 (1856); Bauer v. 
Pullman Co., 15 Ohio App.2d 69,239 N.E.2d 226 (1968); 
Lehman v. Haynam, 104 Ohio App. 198, 147 N.E.2d 870 
(1957). It also includes testimony given at any proceeding 
at which a witness testifies under oath. E.g., Cupps v. 
Toledo, 18 Ohio App. 127, 193 N.E.2d 543 (1960), affirmed 
by, 172 Ohio St. 536, 179 N.E.2d 70 (1961) (testimony 
given before Industrial Commission admitted). Finally, 
grand jury testimony may be admitted against the 
government. United States v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819, 
821 (D.N.J. 1978). ·-
Similar motive to examine 
The rule provides that former testimony is admissible 
only "if the party against whom the testimony is now 
offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor 
in interest, had anopportunity and similar notice to 
develop the testimony by direct; c:ross, or redirect exami-
nation." The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 
804 contains the following commentary: 
Under the exception, the testimony may be offered (1) 
against the party against whom it was previously 
offered or (2) against the party by whom it was previ-
ously offered. In each instance the question resolves 
itself into whether fairness allows imposing, upon the 
party against whom now offered, the handling of the 
witness on the earlier occasion._(1) If the party against 
whom now offered is the one against whom the 
testimony w~soff~r13d previol1sly, no unfairness is 
apparent in requiring him to accept his own prior 
conduct of cross"examination or _decision not to cross-
examine. Only demeanor has been lost, and that is 
inherent in the situation. (2) If the party against whom 
now offered is the one by whom the testimony was 
offered previously, a satisfactory ariswer becomes 
somewhat more difficult. One possibility is to proceed 
somewhat along the line of an a,doptive admission, i.e. 
by offering the testimony proponent in effect adopts it. 
However, this theory savors of discarded concepts of 
witnesses' belonging to a party, of litigants' ability to 
pick and choose witnesses, and of vouching for one's 
own witnesses. Cf. McCormick, § 246, pp. 526-527; 4 
Wigmore§ 1075. A more qirl;lct and acceptable 
approach is simply to recognize direct and redirect 
examination atone's own witness as the equivalent of 
cross-examining an opponent's witness. Falkner, 
Former Testimony and the Uniform Rules: A Comment 
38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 651, n. 1 (1963); McCormick§ 231, p. 
483. See also 5 Wigmore§ 1389. Allowable techniques 
for dealing with hostile, double-crossing, forgetful, and 
mentally deficientwitnesses leave no substance to a 
claim that one could not adequately develop his own 
witness at the former hearing. An even less appealing 
argumentis presented when failure to develop fully 
was the result of a deliberate choice. 
The common law did not limit the admissibility of 
former testimony to that given in an earlier trial of the 
same case, although it did require identity of issues as 
a means of insuring that the former handling of the 
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witness was the equivalent of what would now be do 
if the opportunity were presented. Modern decisions 
reduce the requirement to "substantial" identity. 
McCormick§ 233. Since identity of issues is significi 
only in that it bears on motive and interest in developi 
fully the testimony of the witness, expressing the 
matter in the latter terms is preferable. ld . .. 
The rule does not require "identity of parties." See 
McCormick, Evidence§ 256 (3d ed. 1984). As lOng as t 
party against whom the former testimony is offered (or 
predecessor in interest) had an opportunity to examine 
the witness at the former hearing, the rule is satisfied. 
This represents a change in Ohio law. RC 2317.06 pern 
ted the admission of former testimony evidence only in 
"a further trial of the case." See Lord v. Boschert, 47 01 
App. 54, 189 N.E. 863 (1934) (requiring identity of partie 
As proposed by the U.S. Supreme Court, Federal Ru 
804(b)(1) also would have permitted admission of formt 
testimony if the witness had been examined at a prior 
hearing by a person "with motive and interest similar t< 
those of the party against whom [the testimony] is now 
offered." 56 F. A.D. 321 (1973). This fortnulg~ion of tl)e n 
was rejected by Congress. The House Judiciary Caminiti 
explained its amendment to the Court's rule as follows: 
Rule 804(b)(1) submitted by the Court allowed prio 
testimony of an unavailable witness to be admissible 
the party against whom it is offered or a person 'with 
motive and interest similar' to his had an opportunity 
examine the witness. The Committee considered th< 
it is generally unfair to impose upon the party agains 
whom the hearsay evidence is being offered respon: 
bility for the manner in which the witness was previ-
ously handled by another party. The sole exception t 
this, in the Committee's view, is when a party's 
predecessor in interest in a civil action or proceedin~ 
had an opportunity and similar notice to examine the 
witness. The Committee amended the rule to reflect 
these policy determinations. H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code 
Gong. & Ad. News 7075, 7088. 
The following example illustrates how the rule oper-
ates. Assume that defendant injures A and B in an acci 
dent. In the first trial A sues defendant, and witness X 
testifies. X dies prior to the second trial, in which B sue 
defendant. X's testimony at the first trial is admissible i 
the second trial against defendant because he had an 
opportunity to develop the testimony of X on direct, 
cross, or redirect examination. X's testimony, however, 
not admissible against B, even though A and B had a 
similar motive and interest, because B had no opportUI 
ty to examine X. 
The above interpretation of the rule, however, is not 
beyond challenge. The leading federal case on the isst 
adopted an expansive view of what constitutes a "pred 
cesser in interest"- a "party having like motive to deve 
the same testimony about the same material facts, is, i 
the final analysis, a predecessor in interest to the presE 
party." Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 
1179, 1187 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978). S 
McCormick, Evidence§ 256, at 766 (3d ed. 1984). 
It should be noted that the rule requires only that the 
"opportunity" to develop the testimony by direct, cross 
or redirect examination have been provided at the forrr 
hearing. "Actual cross-examination, of course, is not 
essential, if the opportunity was afforded and waived." 
McCormick, Evidence § 255, at 761 (3d ed. 1984). See 
c::>:_,, also State v. Jester, 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 153, 512 N.E.2d 
y;) 962 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988}; 5 
' Wigmore, Evidence§ 1371 (Chadbourn rev. 1974}. 
Method of proof 
The rule does not specify acceptable methods of prov-
ing former testimony. RC 2945.49 contains the following 
provisions on the method of proof in criminal case: "If 
such former testimony is contained within an authenticat-
ed transcript of such testimony, it shall be proven by the 
transcript, otherwise by other testimony." RC 2317.06 
contains comparable provisions for civfl cases. 
A transcript of the former proceeding is the typical and 
preferable method of proof. See Rule 803(8) (hearsay 
exception for public records}. Former testimony also may 
be proved by the testimony of a witness who was present 
at the time the testimony was given. See Wagers v. Dickey, 
17 Ohio 439 (1848). In Summons v. State, 5 Ohio St. 325 
(1856}, the Supreme Court outlined the following require-
ments: 
It is essential to the competency of the witness called 
to give this kind of evidence, first, that he heard the 
deceased person testify on the former trial; and second, 
that he has such accurate recollection of the matter 
stated, that he will, on his oath, assume or undertake to 
narrate in substance the matter sworn to by the deceased 
person, in all its material parts, or that part thereof 
which he may be called on to prove /d. (syllabus}. 
See McCormick, Evidence§ 260 (3d. ed. 1984}. The 
testimony of a witness should be used as a method of 
proof only if a transcript is not available. The court has 
the authority pursuant to Rule 611(A} to require a tran-
script be used if one is available. 
DYING DECLARATIONS 
Rule 804(8) (2) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
dying declarations. The rule requires that: (1)the statement 
be made while the declarant believed his death was immi-
nent; (2) the statement concern the "cause or circumstances 
of what [the declarant] believed to be his impending 
death"; (3) the declarant be unavailable (see Rule 
804(A}}; and (4) the statement was based on the firsthand 
knowledge of the declarant. See Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid 804 ("continuation of a requirement of 
firsthand knowledge is assured by Rule 602"). 
The rule is identical to Federal Rule 804(b)(2} except 
for technical differences. The rule changes prior Ohio 
law in two respects. First, at common law, dying declara-
tions were admissible only in homicide cases. See State 
v. Harper, 35 Ohio St. 78 (1878}; Mitchell v. New York Life 
Insurance Co., 62 Ohio App. 54, 22 N.E.2d 998 (1939), 
reversed on other grounds, 136 Ohio St. 551,27 N.E.2d 
243 (1940); McCoy v.lndustrial Comm., 58 Ohio L. Abs. 
513, 97 N.E.2d 93 (App. 1950}. Under the rule, dying 
declarations are admissible in civil actions as well. Dying 
declarations, however, remain inadmissible in criminal 
trials other than homicide cases. Second, in contrast to 
the common law, admissibility is not conditioned on the 
declarant's death. Any of the conditions of unavailability 
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specified in Rule 804(A) suffices. 
The exception for dying declarations is based on 
necessity- the unavailability of the declarant- and on 
a circumstaritia] guarantee of trustworthiness. Dying 
declarations "are made in extremity, when the party is at 
the point of death, and when every hope of this world is 
gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and 
the mind is induced, by the most powerful considera-
tions, to speak the truth; a situation so solemn, and so 
awful, is considered by the law as creating an obligation 
equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath 
administered in a court of justice." Rex v. Woodcock, 1 
Leach 500,502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352,353 (K.B. 1789}, 
quoted in State v. Kindle, 47 Ohio St. 358, 365,24 N.E. 
485,488 (1890). 
Imminent expectation of death 
The rule provides that the statement must be "made 
by a declarant while believing that his death was immi-
nent." This requirement follows from the theory underly-
ing the exception; a declarant who does not believe that 
death is near may not feel compelled to speak truthfully. 
In Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933), Justice 
Cardozo described this requirement: 
To make out a dying declaration the declarant must 
have spoken without hope of recovery and in the shad-
ow of impending death ... 
... There must be a 'settled hopeless expectation' ... 
that death is near at hand, and what is said must have 
been so spoken in the hush of its impending pres-
ence ... What is decisive is the state of mind. Even so, 
the state of mind must be exhibited in the evidence, 
and not left to conjecture. The [declarant) must have 
spoken with the consciousness of a swift and certain 
doom.ld. at 99-100. 
See a/so State v. Kindle, 47 Ohio St. 358, 24 N.E. 485 
(1890) (statement of declarant "made in extremis, while 
conscious of his condition and under a sense of impend-
ing dissolution"); Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131, 163 
(1857} (statement "made under a sense of impending 
death, excluding from the mind of the dying person a// 
hope or expectation ofrecovery"); State v. Woods, 47 
Ohio App.2d 144,352 N.E.2d 598 (1972}. 
The declarant's belief of impending death may be 
established by the declarant's own statements. In addi-
tion, it may be established "circumstantially by the 
apparent fatal quality of the wound, by the statements 
made to the declarant by the doctor or by others that his 
condition is hopeless, and by other circumstances." 
McCormick, Evidence§ 282, at 829 (3d ed. 1984). See 
also State v. Knight, 20 Ohio App.3d 289, 485 N.E.2d 
1064 (1984) ('[l]mmediately before he made the state-
ment, police told him that he did not have long to live."); 
State v. Kotowicz, 55 Ohio App. 497,9 N.E.2d 1003 
(1937); Shinkman v. State, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 518 (App. 1929). 
Subject matter requirement 
The rule limits.the type of statements that are admissi-
ble under this exception to those "concerning the cause 
or circumstances of what [the declarant] believed to be 
his impending death." Statements identifying the 
assailant who caused the injury are included, as are 
statements describing the events leading up to the injury. 
See McCormick, Evidence§ 283 (3d ed. 1984); 5 Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 1434, at 282 (Chadbourn rev 1974) ("facts 
leading up to or causing or attending the injurious act"). 
Opinion rule 
Some courts have excluded dying declarations as 
violative of the opinion rule. See McCormick, Evidence § 
285 (3d ed: 1984). In Wroe v. State, 20 Ohio St. 460 
(1870), the defendant objected to the admission of the 
dying declaration ofa victim who stated, "it was done 
without any provocation," on the grounds that the state-
ment expressed a "mere matter of opinion." The 
Supreme Court held: "Whether there was provocation or 
not, is a fact, not stated, it is true, in the most elementary 
form of which it is susceptible, but sufficiently so to be 
admissible as evidence." ld at 469. The result in Wroe is 
correct. As McCormick notes, the opinion rule "is entirely 
inappropriate as a restriction upon out-of-court declara-
tions." McCormick, Evidence§ 285, at 832 (3ded. 1984). 
See also Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R~ Evid 804 
("Any problem as to dec.larations phrased in terms of 
opinion is laid at rest by Rule 701."). 
STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST 
Rule 804(B)(3) recognizes a hearsay exception for 
statements against interest. Such statements are admis-
sible if (1) they are based on firsthand knowledge, (2) they 
are against the declarant's pecuniary, proprietary, penal, 
or cjyjl}ial::lilityioterest at the time made, and (3) the 
declarant is unavailable, see Rule 804(A). Statements of 
parties are admissible as admissions of party-opponents 
under Rule 801(0)(2). · · 
The exception for declarations against interest is 
based on necessity- the unavailability of the declarant 
- and a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. 
"The circumstantial guaranty of reliability for declarations 
against interest is the assumption that persons do not 
make statements which are damaging to themselves 
unless satisfied for good reason that they are true." 
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid 804. 
Firsthand knowledge 
Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the rule, first-
hand knowledge ori the part of the declarant is required. 
See G. M. McKelvey Co. v. General Casualty Co., 166 
Ohio St. 401, 404, 142 N.E.2d 854, 855-56 (1957) 
("declarant had peculiar means of knowing the facts 
which he stated"); Latham v. Clark, 120 Ohio St. 559, 166 
N.E. 68!:) (1929). 
Against interest requirement 
The rule provides that the statement must have been 
"so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprie-
tary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or 
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him 
against another, that a reasonable man in his position 
would not have made the statement unless he believed it 
to be true." As proposed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
federal rule also permitted the admissibility of declara-
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tions against social interest, that is, a statement making 
the declarant "an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace." 
56 F.R.D. 321 (1973). This provision was rejected by 
Congress and was not incorporated in the Ohio rule. 
The Staff Note contains the following comment: "The 
exceptions to the hearsay rule subjecting declarant to 
civil or criminal liability broaden the traditional law 
governing declarations against interest and broaden 
Ohic;>law as well, the Ohio law having been limited to 
declarations against pecuniary interest." This comment, 
however, does not accurately reflect prior.Ohio law; In 
G.M. McKelvey Co. v. General Casualty Go., 166 Ohio St. 
401, 142 N.E.2d 854 (1957), the Supreme Court held . 
declarations against "pecuniary or proprietary interest" 
admissible. The case involved statements concerning 
embezzlement by the declarants. The Court interpreted 
"pecuniary interest" expansively to include statements 
which would subject the declarants to civil liability: ''Ii]t 
was clearly notto their interest to state such facts, since 
such declarations render them civilly liable for the 
amounts of their defalcations." lcj. at 405. Moreover, in 
State v. Williams, 43 Ohio St.2d 88, 330 N.E.2d 891 
(1975), the Supreme Court appeared to recognize the 
admissibility of declarations against penal interests. 
Other Ohio cases on declarations against interest, 
which were decided prior to the adoption ofthe Rules of 
Evidence, include: Latham v. Clark, 120 Ohio St. 559, 166 
N.E: 685 (1929}; Ferrebee v. Boggs, 24 Ohio App.2d 18, 
263 N.E.2d 574 (1970); 67 Corp v. Elias, 3 Ohio App.2d 
411, 210 N.E.2d 734 (1965); Fox v. McCreary, 103 Ohio 
App. 73, 144 N.E.2d 546 (1957); Massachusetts Bonding ~ 
& Insurance Co. v. Cleveland, 91 Ohio L. Abs. 569, 187 ' 
N.E.2d 369 (App. 1963). See generally Note, Admissions 
"Against Interest" in Ohio, 15 Ohio St. L.J. 187 (1954). 
Rule 804(B)(3) requires that the statement be against 
the declarant's interest "at the time of its making." See 
State v. Williams, 38 Ohio St.3d 346, ~48 n.6, 528 N.E.2d 
910 (1988) ("[T]he statement does not meet the requirement 
that it [has] been against Brown's pecuniary, proprietary 
or penal interest at the time of its making."). Determining 
whether the statement is, in fact, against interest requires 
an examination of the context in which the statement was 
made. See McCormick, Evidence§ 279 (3d ed.J984) .. 
For example, a statement acknowledging a debt of $500 
would, under most circumstances be a statement against 
the declarant's pecuniary interest. If, however, the declar-
ant made the statement while disputing a $1000 debt, 
and the statement is offered to prove the debt was only 
$500, the statement is not against interest. By its terms, 
the rule requires the ·~against interest" standard to be 
judged by a "reasonable man" viewpoint. 
The declaration against interest exception has been 
the subject of constitutional attack. In Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410.U.S. 284 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the exclusion of declarations against penal 
interest offered by a criminal defendant for the purpose 
of exculpation was a violation of due process. See also 
Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979). It should be noted ' 
that the declarant in Chambers was not unavailable. 
Thus, in criminal cases the applicability of Rule 804(B)(3) 
is affected by constitutional considerations. See general-
ly 4 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence§ 489 (1980). 
Corroboration requirement 
The rule provides that a "statement tending to expose 
the declarant to criminal liability, whether offered to 
exculpate or inculpate the accused, is not admissible 
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement." The use of the word 
"accused" indicates that the corroboration requirement 
was intended to apply only in criminal cases. 
In contrast to the Ohio rule, Federal Rule 804(b)(3) 
expressly requires corroboration only when the state-
mentis offered to exculpate the accused. The federal 
cases, however, have applied the corroboration require-
ment to inculpatory statements. McCormick, Evidence§ 
279, at 826 (3d ed.1984). The corroboration requirement 
was explained by the federal drafters as follows: 
The refusal of the common law to concede the 
adequacy of a penal interest was no doubt indefensi-
ble in logic, ... but one senses in the decisions a 
distrust of evidence of confessions by third persons 
offered to exculpate the accused arising from suspi-
cions of fabrication either of the fact of the making of 
the confession or in its contents, enhanced in either 
instance by the required unavailability of the declarant. 
Nevertheless, an increasing amount of decisional law 
recognizes exposure to punishment for crime as a 
sufficient stake ... The requirement of corroboration is 
included in the rule in order to effect an accommoda-
tion between these competing considerations ... The 
requirement of corroboration should be construed in 
such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circum-
venting fabrication. Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. 
R. Evid. 804. 
The Ohio Staff Note makes the following observation: 
Note that the language is "corroborating circumstances" 
not "corroborating evidence." See also State v. Saunders, 
23 Ohio App.3d 69, 73, 491 N.E.2d 313 (1984) ("[A) bare 
showing of some extent of corroboration is not enough."). 
The Ohio rule also requires corroboration of statements 
inculpating the accused- for example, a statement by 
an accomplice that he and the accused committed a 
crime. The corroboration requirement was added 
because such statements are often self-serving, and 
their admission raises confrontation issues. See United 
States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978). A draft of 
the Federal Rules explicitly excluded such statements. 
"This exception does not include a statement or confes-
sion offered against the accused in a criminal case, 
made by a codefendant or other person implicating both 
himself and the accused." 51 F.R.D. 439 (1971) (revised 
draft). This provision was reinserted by the House Judici-
ary Committee. See H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Gong., 1st 
Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974) U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. 
News 7075, 7090. It was subsequently deleted by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee because that Committee 
believed it unnecessary. SeeS. Rep. No. 1277, 93d 
Gong., 2d Sess, reprinted in [1974) U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. 
News 7051, 7068. 
Although Federal Rule 804 as adopted allows the 
introduction of statements inculpating the accused, the 
Advisory Committee's Note to the rule recognizes that 
such statements may not always be reliable: "Whether a 
statement is in fact against interest must be determined 
from the circumstances of each case. Thus, a statement 
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admitting guilt and implicating another person, made 
while in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to 
curry favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify 
as against interest ... On the other hand, the same words 
spoken under different circumstances, e.g., to an 
acquaintance, would have no difficulty in qualifying. The 
rule does not purport to deal with questions of the right of 
confrontation." 
See also State v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St.2d 583, 587, 
433 N.E.2d 561 (1982) (Declarant's statements made to 
FBI agents in an effort to be accepted into the witness 
protection program were not against his interest, but for 
his interest); Neigbours v. State, 121 Ohio St. 525, 169 
N.E. 839 (1930). 
RESIDUAL EXCEPTION 
Federal Rule 804(b) (5) recognizes a residual or catch-
all exception, which under certain circumstances permits 
the admission of hearsay statements that do not fall with-
in the scope of the exceptions enumerated in Federal 
Rule 804. This_ provision was not adopted in Ohio. Thus a 
case•such as Erion v. Timken Co., 52 Ohio App.2d 123, 
368 N.E.2d 312 (1976), which adopted an ad hoc 
approach to hearsay exceptions, is no longer controlling. 
See State v. Fowler, 27 Ohio App.3d 149, 153, 27 OBR 
182, 500 N.E.2d 390 (Cuyahoga 1985) ("[T]he Ohio rules 
contain neither of the 'catch-all' exceptions ... "). 
DOUBLE HEARSAY 
Rule 805 governs the admissibility of multiple hearsay. 
The rule permits the admission of hearsay within hearsay 
if each part of the hearsay chain falls within an exception. 
Multiple hearsay problems most frequently arise in 
connection with public records, Rule 803(8), and busi-
ness records, Rule 803(6), especially hospital records. 
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 805 
contains the following explanation: 
On principle it scarcely seems open to doubt that the 
hearsay rule should not call for exclusion of a hearsay 
statement which includes a further hearsay statement 
when both conform to the requirements of a hearsay 
exception. Thus a hospital record might contain an 
entry of the patient's age based on information furnished 
by his wife. The hospital record would qualify as a 
regular entry except that the person who furnished the 
information was not acting In the routine of the busi-
ness. However, her statement independently qualifies 
as a statement of pedigree (if she is unavailable) or as 
a statement made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment, 
and hence each link in the chain falls under sufficient 
assurances. Or, further to illustrate, a dying declaration 
may incorporate a declaration against interest by 
another declarant ... 
The Staff Note cites as an example of double hearsay a 
case involving a hospital record which contains a statement 
by a party. According to the Note, the record is admissible 
because the hospital record qualifies as a business 
record, Rule 803(6), and the statement of the party 
qualifies as an admission of a party-opponent, Rule 
801(D)(2)(a). Although the Staff Note's conclusion that 
the record is admissible is correct, its analysis is not. 
Admissions of party-opponents, by definition, are not 
hearsay. Thus, the particular exa.m.ple set out in the Staff 
Note does not present a "double hearsay" problem. 
The Rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. In Westing-
house Electric Corp v. Dolly Madison Leasing & Furniture 
Corp., 42 Ohio St.2d 122, 326 N.E.2d 651 (1975), the 
Supreme Court in considering the admissibility of state-
ments contained in an official record, stated: "This statute 
[RC 2317.42] allows the admission of official records, 
although these records may constitute hearsay, insofar 
as they consist of facts recorded by public officials who 
are not present as witnesses. However, the statute does 
not render admissible statements contained in official 
reports, where such statements are themselves hearsay." 
/d. at 130. See also Green v. Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 441, 
83 N.E.2d 63 (1948); Schmitt v. Doehler Die Casting Co., 
143 Ohio St. 421, 55 N .E.2d 644 (1944); Hytha v. 
Schwendeman, 40 Ohio App.2d 478, 484, 320 N.E.2d 
312, 317 (1974) (" 'hearsay on tiearsay,' in the absence of 
other exceptions to the general hearsay rule is not admis-
sible, even in view of the business records as evidence 
statute."); Ohio Credit Corp v. Brigham, 25 Ohio Misc. 
241, 266 N.E.2d 867 (Muni. 1970). .,, 
IMPEACHMENT OF DECLARANTS 
Rule 806 governs the admissibility of evidence relating 
to the credibility of hearsay declarants and persons who 
make statements admitted pursuant to Rule 801(D)(2)(c) 
(authorized admissions), Rule 801(D)(2)(d) (servant and 
agent admissions), and Rule 801(0)(2)(3) (co-conspirator 
admissions). The rule also provides that if a party against 
whom a hearsay statement is admitted calls the declarant 
as a witness, that party may examine the declarant "as 
if under-cross-examination.'' This provision provides an 
automatic exception to Rule 611(C), which generally 
prohibits the use of leading questions on direct 
examination. 
Rule 806 generally permits hearsay declarants and 
persons making representative admissions under Rule 
801(0)(2) to be impeached and rehabilitated to the same 
extent as witnesses who testify at trial. See Rule 607 
(impeachment of own witness); Rule 608(A) (impeach-
ment by opinion and reputation evidence of character for 
truthfulness); Rule 608(B)(impeachment by evidence of 
specific acts of conduct relevant to character for truthful-
ness); Rule 609 (impeachment by evidence of pri!Jr con-
victions); Rule 613 (impeachment by prior inconsistent 
statements). 
Rule 806 may be a trap for a defense counsel in a 
criminal case. If an accused's hearsay statements are 
elicited by the defensecounsel through another witness, 
Rule 806 applies and the defendant may be impeached 
even though he never testified. See United States v. 
Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1330-31 (7th Cir.1985), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985) (impeachment by prior 
conviction); United States v. Bovain, 708 F.2d 606, 613 
(11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 898 (1983); United 
6 
States v. Lawson, 608 F.2d 1129, (6th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1129 (1980). 
Inconsistent statements 
The second sentence of Rule 806 establishes a 
special rule for impeachment by evidence of inconsistent 
statements: "Evidence of a statement or conduct by the 
declarant at any time, inconsistent with his hearsay state-
ment, is not subject to any requirement that he may have 
been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain." Hence, 
Rule 613(8), which requires that a witness be provided 
with an opportunity to explain or deny an inconsistent 
statement before extrinsic evidence of that statement is 
admissible, does not extend to the impeachment of hear-
say declarants. For example, inconsistent statements 
made subsequent to the hearsay statement are admissi-
ble. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 806 
provides the following explanation for this rule: 
The declarant of a hearsay statement which is admit-
ted in evidence is in effect a witness. His credibility 
should in fairness be subject to impeachment and 
support as though he had iri fact testified. See Rules 
608 and 609. There are, however, some special 
aspects of the impeaching of a hearsay declarant 
which require consideration. These specia·l aspects 
center upon impeachment by inconsistent statement, 
arise from factual differences which exist between the 
use of hearsay and an actual witness and also 
between various kinds of hearsay, and involve the 
question of applying to declarants the general rule 
disallowing evidence of an inconsistent statement to 
impeach a witness unless he is afforded an opportuni-
ty to deny or explain. See Rule 613(b). 
The principal difference between using hearsay and 
an actual witness is that the inconsistent statement will 
in the case of the witness almost inevitably of necessi-
ty in the nature of things be a prior statement, which is 
is entirely possible and feasible to call to his attention, 
while in the case of hearsay the inconsistent statement 
may well be a subsequent one, which practically 
precludes calling it to the attention of the declarant. 
The result of insisting upon observation of this impos-
sible requirement in the hearsay situation is to deny 
the opponent, already barred from cross-examination, 
any benefit of this important technique of 
impeachment ... 
The few Ohio cases that have addressed this issue 
appear to be divided. In an early case, Runyan v. Price, 
15 Ohio St. 1 (1864), the Supreme Court held that 
impeachment by means of an inconsistent statement 
always requires that the declarant be afforded an oppor-
tunity to deny or explain the statement. In contrast, the 
court in State v. Earley, 49 Ohio App.2d 377, 361 N.E.2d 
254 (1975), held that an accused had a due process right 
to introduce evidence impeaching the credibility of a 
declarant whose preliminary hearing testimony had been 
admitted at trial. 
